Many cryptographic applications of hash functions are analyzed in the random oracle model. Unfortunately, most concrete hash functions, including the SHA family, use the iterative (strengthened) Merkle-Damgård transform applied to a corresponding compression function. Moreover, it is well known that the resulting "structured" hash function cannot be generically used as a random oracle, even if the compression function is assumed to be ideal. This leaves a large disconnect between theory and practice: although no attack is known for many concrete applications utilizing existing (Merkle-Damgård based) hash functions, there is no security guarantee either, even by idealizing the compression function.
Introduction
The primary security goal for cryptographic hash functions has historically been collision-resistance. Consequently, in-use hash functions, such as the SHA family of functions [30] , were designed using the (strengthened) Merkle-Damgård (MD) transform [18, 29] : the input message M is suffix-free encoded (e.g. by appending a message block containing the length of M ) and then digested by the cascade construction using an underlying fixed-input-length (FIL) compression function. The key security feature of the strengthened MD transformation is that it is collision-resistance preserving [18, 29] . Namely, as long as the FIL compression function is collision-resistant, the resulting variable-input-length (VIL) hash function will be collision-resistant too.
RANDOM ORACLE MODEL. Unfortunately, the community has come to understand that collision-resistance alone is insufficient to argue the security of many important applications of hash functions. Moreover, many of these applications (e.g. Fiat-Shamir [24] signatures or RSA [4] encryption) are such that no standard model security assumption about the hash function appears to suffice for proving security. On the other hand, no realistic attacks against these applications have been found. Motivated in part by these considerations, Bellare and Rogaway [4] introduced the Random Oracle (RO) model, which models the hash function as a public oracle implementing a random function. Using this abstraction, Bellare and Rogaway [4, 5, 6] and literally thousands of subsequent works managed to formally argue the security of important schemes. Despite the fact that a proof in the RO model does not always guarantee security when one uses a real (standard model) hash function [13] , such a proof does provide evidence that the scheme is structurally sound. Moreover, many important in-use cryptographic schemes only have provable security guarantees in the RO model.
IS MERKLE-DAMGÅRD A GOOD DESIGN?
Given the ubiquity of MD-based hash functions in practice, and the success of the RO model in provable security, it is natural to wonder if a MD-based hash function H is reasonably modeled as a RO, at least when the compression function is assumed to be ideal. But even without formalizing this question, one can see that the answer is negative. For example, the well-known extension attack allows one to take a value H(x) for unknown x, and then compute the value H(x, , y), where is the length of x and y is an arbitrary suffix. Clearly, this should be impossible for a truly random function. In fact, this discrepancy leads to simple attacks for natural schemes proven secure in the random oracle model (see [17] ).
Consequently, Coron et al. [17] adapted the indifferentiability framework of Maurer et al. [28] to define formally what it means to build a secure VIL-RO from smaller (FIL) idealized components (such as an ideal compression function or ideal cipher). Not surprisingly, they showed that the strengthened MD transform does not meet this notion of security, even when applied to an ideal compression function. Although [17] (and several subsequent works [2, 3, 27] ) presented straightforward fixes to the MD paradigm that yield hash functions indifferentiable from a VIL-RO, we are still faced with a large disconnect between theory and practice. Namely, many applications only enjoy proofs of security when the hash function is modeled as a "monolithic" VIL-RO, while in practice these applications use existing MD-based hash functions which (as we just argued) are demonstrably differentiable from a monolithic RO (even when compression functions are ideal). Yet despite this gap, no practical attacks on the MD-based design (like the extension attack) seem to apply for these important applications.
"SALVAGING" MERKLE-DAMGÅRD. The situation leads us to a question not addressed prior to this work: given a current scheme that employs an MD-based hash function H and yet does not seem vulnerable to extension-type attacks, can we prove its security (at least if the compression function f is assumed to be ideal)? The most direct way to answer this question would be to re-prove, from scratch, the security of a given application when an MD-based hash function is used. Instead, we take a more modular approach consisting of the following steps:
(1) Identify a natural (idealized) property X that is satisfied by a random oracle.
(2) Argue that X suffices for proving the security of a given (class of) application(s), originally proved secure when H is modeled as a monolithic RO.
(3) Argue that the strengthened MD-transform satisfies X, as long as its compression function f satisfies some related property Y .
(4) Conclude that, as long as the compression function f satisfies Y , the given (class of) application(s) is secure with an MD-based hash function H.
Although this approach might not be applicable to all scenarios, when it is applicable it has several obvious advantages over direct proofs. First, it supports proofs that are easier to derive, understand, and verify. Second, proving that a hash function satisfying X alone is enough (as opposed to being like a "full-blown" RO) for a given application elucidates more precisely which (idealized) property of the hash function is essential for security. Third, if the property X is natural, it is interesting to study in its own right. Indeed, we will show several applications of our notions which are quite general and not necessarily motivated by salvaging the MD transform. Finally, due to point (4) , it suffices to argue/assume "only" that the compression function f -a smaller and much-better-studied object -satisfies some related property Y . Typically, if Y corresponds to being FIL-RO, it would be easy to conclude that the MD-transform satisfies X, which will already be quite useful. In our examples, however, we will be able to derive this conclusion for considerably weaker properties Y , which corresponds to a wider class of "admissible" compression functions f . For example, most in-use compression functions f are built from a block cipher E via the Davies-Meyer transform: f (c, x) = E x (c) ⊕ c. It was shown in [17] that this construction is not indifferentiable from a FIL-RO, even if E is assumed to be an ideal cipher. Despite this, in our examples we will be able to argue, in the ideal cipher model, that the Davies-Meyer compression function satisfies the property Y sufficient to prove that the iterated hash function H satisfies X. As a result, the resulting applications we consider are provably secure with existing block cipher-based hash functions (in the ideal-cipher model). So which properties X (and Y )? We introduce two: preimage awareness and indifferentiability from a public-use random oracle. For preimage awareness, the corresponding property Y will also be preimage awareness, which means that the Merkle-Damgård transform is property-preserving for this new notion. For public-use random oracles, the property Y will be even weaker than public-use random oracles, which not only implies property-preservation, but will allow us to justify the use of the Davies-Meyer compression function (which is differentiable from a public-use random oracle, but satisfies this weaker notion). We detail these new notions below.
Preimage Aware Functions
A function being Preimage Aware (PrA) means, informally, that if an attacker can output a range point y and subsequently produce a preimage x for y, then in fact the attacker "already knew" x when it output y. To get an idea of how we formalize this, consider a hash function H built using some ideal primitive P (which could model a compression function or a block cipher). Then the PrA security experiment is loosely defined as follows. An attacker, using oracle access to P , first outputs a range point y. Then a deterministic algorithm called an extractor is run on y and the transcript of the attacker's interaction with P (the queries and their associated responses); it outputs a domain point x . The attacker wins if it can (using further access to P ) output a domain point x = x such that H(x) = y. Intuitively, this definition captures that producing a preimage-image pair under H requires actually evaluating H on the preimage in a manner that reveals it to anyone observing the attacker's oracle calls. Our notion is very similar in spirit to the notion of plaintext awareness for encryption schemes [4, 1] and the notion of extractability for perfectly one-way functions [11, 12] ; we discuss these similarities in more detail, below.
We notice that random oracles are clearly PrA. In fact, preimage awareness precisely captures the spirit behind a common proof technique used in the RO model, often referred to as extractability, making it an interesting notion to consider. We also show that preimage awareness is a natural strengthening of collision-resistance (CR). That preimage awareness lies between being a RO and CR turns out to be quite useful: informally, a PrA function is "strong enough" to be a good replacement for a RO in some applications (where CR is insufficient), and yet the notion of preimage awareness is "weak enough" to be preserved by strengthened MD (like CR).
MERKLE-DAMGÅRD PRESERVES PREIMAGE AWARENESS. We show that the (strengthened) MD transform preserves preimage awareness, in stark contrast to the fact that it does not preserve indifferentiability from a RO [17] . Thus, to design a variable-input-length preimage aware (VIL-PrA) function, it is sufficient to construct a FIL-PrA function, or, even better, argue that existing compression functions are PrA, even when they are not necessarily (indifferentiable from) random oracles. The proof of this is somewhat similar to (but more involved than) the corresponding proof that MD preserves collision-resistance.
APPLICATION: DOMAIN EXTENSION FOR ROS.
A PrA hash function is exactly what is needed to argue secure domain extension of a random oracle. More precisely, assuming h is a FIL-RO, and H is a VIL-PrA hash function (whose output length matches that of the input of h), then F (x) = h(H(x)) is indifferentiable from a VIL-RO. Ironically, when H is just CR, the above construction of F was used by [17] to argue that CR functions are not sufficient for domain extension of a RO. Thus, the notion of PrA can be viewed simultaneously as a non-trivial strengthening of CR, which makes such domain extension work, while also a non-trivial weakening of RO, which makes it more readily achieved.
RECIPE FOR HASH DESIGN. The previous two properties of PrA functions give a general recipe for how to construct hash functions suitable for modeling as a VIL-RO. First, invest as must as needed to construct a strong FIL function h (i.e. one suitable for modeling as a FIL-RO.) Even if h is not particularly efficient, this is perhaps acceptable because it will only be called once per message (on a short input). Second, specify an efficient construction of a VIL-PrA hash function built from some cryptographic primitive P . But for this we use the fact that MD is PrA-preserving; hence, it is sufficient to focus on constructing a FIL-PrA compression function f from P , and this latter task could be much easier than building from P an object indifferentiable from a FIL-RO.
Adopting our more modular point-of-view, several existing hash constructions in the literature [17, 2, 3, 32, 21] enjoy an easier analysis. For example, the NMAC construction of [17] becomes an example of our approach, where the outer h and the inner f are both implemented to be like (independent) FIL-ROs. In [17] it is argued directly, via a difficult and long argument, that the inner f can be replaced by the Davies-Meyer construction (in the ideal-cipher model), despite the fact that Davies-Meyer is not itself indifferentiable from a FIL-RO. We can instead just prove that Davies-Meyer is PrA (which requires only a few lines due to the existing proofs of CR [7, 37] ) and then conclude.
LIFTING FROM CR TO PrA. Another important aspect of preimage awareness is that, for many important constructions, it gives a much more satisfactory security target than collision resistance. Indeed, there exists a large body of work [31, 7, 25, 26, 34, 35, 33, 21] building FIL-CR hash functions from idealized blockciphers and permutations. On the one hand, it seems very hard to prove the security of such schemes in the standard model, since there exists a black-box separation [36] between collision-resistant hash functions and standard-model block ciphers (which are equivalent to one-way functions). On the other hand, it seems quite unsatisfactory that one starts with such a "powerful" idealized primitive (say, an ideal cipher), only to end up with a much "weaker" standard model guarantee of collision resistance (which is also insufficient for many applications of hash functions). The notion of preimage awareness provides a useful solution to this predicament. We show that all the FIL constructions proven CR in [7, 35, 33, 21] are provably PrA. This is interesting in its own right, but also because one can now use these practical constructions within our aforementioned recipe for hash design. We believe (but offer no proof) that most other CR ideal-primitive-based functions, e.g. [25, 26, 34] , are also PrA.
We note that it is also possible to prove that a VIL-CR hash function is PrA even if the underlying compression function is not. Of course, in this case we must step outside of our modular approach (point (4), in particular). As an example, in Appendix C we show that the Group-2 blockcipher-based compression functions from [7, 31] (which are not even CR) do yield a PrA-hash when iterated.
OTHER APPLICATIONS/CONNECTIONS? We believe that PrA functions have many more applications than the ones so far mentioned. As one example, PrA functions seem potentially useful for achieving straight-line extractability for various primitives, such as commitments or zero-knowledge proofs. These, in turn, could be useful in other contexts. As already mentioned, preimage awareness seems to be quite related to the notion of plaintext awareness in public-key encryption schemes [5, 1] , and it would be interesting to formalize this potential connection. PrA functions are also very related to so called extractable hash functions (EXT) recently introduced by Canetti and Dakdouk [11, 12] . However, there are some important differences between EXT and PrA, which appear to make our respective results inapplicable to each other: (a) EXT functions are defined in the standard model, while PrA functions in an idealized model; (b) EXT functions are keyed (making them quite different from in-use hash functions), while PrA functions can be keyed or unkeyed; (c) EXT functions do not permit the attacker to sample any "unextractable" image y, while PrA functions only exclude images y which could be later "useful" to the attacker; (d) EXT functions allow the extractor to depend on the attacker, while PrA functions insist on a universal extractor.
Public-Use Random Oracles
Next, we consider applications that never evaluate a hash function on secret data (i.e. data that must be hidden from adversaries). This means that whenever the hash function is evaluated on some input x by an honest party C, it is safe to immediately give x to the attacker A. We model this by formalizing the notion of a public-use random oracle (pub-RO); such a RO can be queried by adversaries to reveal all so-far-queried messages. This model was independently considered, under a different motivation, by Yoneyama et al. [39] using the name leaky random oracle. Both of our papers observe that this weakening of the RO model is actually enough to argue security of many (but, certainly, not all) classical schemes analyzed in the random oracle model. In particular, a vast majority of digital signature schemes, including Full Domain Hash (FDH) [4] , probabilistic FDH [16] , Fiat-Shamir [24] , BLS [10] , PSS [6] and many others, are easily seen secure in the pub-RO model. For example, in the FDH signature scheme [4] , the RO H is only applied to the message m supplied by the attacker, to ensure that the attacker cannot invert the value H(m) (despite choosing m). Other applications secure in the pub-RO model include several identity-based encryption schemes [9, 8] , where the random oracle is only used to hash the user identity, which is public.
We go on to formalize this weakening of ROs in the indifferentiability framework of Maurer et al. [28] . This allows us to define what it means for a hash function H (utilizing some ideal primitive P ) to be indifferentiable from a public-use random oracle. We call such a hash function a public pseudorandom oracle (pub-PRO).
MERKLE-DAMGÅRD CONSTRUCTS PUBLIC-USE ROS. As our main technical result here, we argue that the MD transform preserves indifferentiability from a pub-RO, even though it does not preserve general indifferentiability from a (regular) RO. To get some intuition about this fact, it is instructive to examine the extension attack mentioned earlier, which was the root of the problem with MD for general indifferentiability. There one worried about adversaries being able to infer the hash output on a message with unknown prefix. In the public-use setting, this is not an issue at all: the security of a public-use application could never be compromised by extension attacks since all messages are known by the attacker.
PUBLIC-USE COMPRESSION FUNCTIONS. Our modular approach allows us to dig deeper, investigating the suitability of various compression function designs for use within MD to build hash functions that enjoy indifferentiability from a pub-RO. It is clear that a FIL RO or FIL pub-RO would suffice. Unfortunately, widely-used compression functions are not suitable for modeling as even pub-ROs, because they are based on block ciphers. (Briefly, that ciphers are invertible obviates hope of such compression functions being indifferentiable from a pub-RO.) This is doubly unfortunate since widely used hash functions, such as the SHA family, are constructed using such compression functions. We therefore formalize a further-restricted variant of a pub-RO for compression functions: a public-use guarded RO. Informally, this is an FIL RO that is used by honest parties only within the confines of the MD transform. (Dishonest parties can use the RO in arbitrary manners.) We go on to strengthen our preservation result regarding MD above to show that MD applied to any (object indifferentiable from a) public-use guarded RO results in a full public-use RO. Further, we go on to show that all of the PGV type-2 compression functions applied to an ideal cipher are indifferentiable from public-use guarded ROs. Note that this approach is still entirely modular, allowing independent (and simpler) analyses of compression function and transform. DISCUSSION. Our results, combined with the composition theorem of [28] , give a plethora of new, important provable security results. Namely, for any scheme only proven secure in the RO model and whose security is unaffected by public dissemination of hashed messages, our results give the first ever proofs of security (in the ideal cipher model) when using hash functions such as SHA-2. Since SHA-2 (and even SHA-1) will be in use for many years to come, these positive results importantly help explain when such hash functions are secure to use.
Preliminaries
When S is a set, x ←$ S means to sample uniformly from S and assign the resultant value to x. We write D + for the set ({0, 1} d ) + . We write x ←$ A to denote running algorithm A with fresh random coins and assigning its output to x. For For any algorithm f that accepts inputs from Dom ⊆ {0, 1} * , we write Time(f, m) to mean the maximum time to run f (x) for any input x ∈ Dom such that |x| ≤ m. When f is a function with domain Dom ⊆ {0, 1} * , we define Time(f, m) to be the minimum, over all programs T f that implement the mapping f , of the size of T f plus the worst case running time of T f over all elements x ∈ Dom such that |x| ≤ m. In either case, when we suppress the second argument, writing just Time(f ), we mean to maximize over all strings in the domain. Running times are relative to some fixed underlying RAM model of computation, which we do not specify here.
As a small abuse of standard notation, we write O(X) to hide absolute constants that are dominated by the argument X.
INTERACTIVE TMS. An Interactive Turing Machine (ITM) accepts inputs via an input tape, performs some local computation using internal state that persists across invocations, and replies via an output tape. An ITM might implement various distinct functionalities f 1 , f 2 , . . . that are to be exposed to callers. An interface of an ITM specifies that writing one of a certain subset of possible strings on the input tape invokes a particular functionality. For example, writing i s (where the number i is suitably encoded as a string) results in executing f i on s. When we write P = (f 1 , f 2 , . . .), this means that ITM P implements the functionalities f 1 , f 2 , . . . using some fixed interface semantics. We write P = (f 1 , f 2 , . . .) for an ITM implementing f 1 , f 2 , · · · . When functionalities f i , f j (say) do not share state, we say that f i and f j are independent functionalities; these will be explicitly noted. We will (slightly abusing notation) write f i to refer to accessing an ITM via interface f i . We sometimes distinguish between private interfaces and public interfaces (following terminology from [28] ), writing P = ((f 1 , f 2 , . . .), (f 1 , f 2 , . . .)) to denote the ITM P that has private interfaces f 1 , f 2 , . . . and public interfaces f 1 , f 2 , . . .. (Looking ahead, private interfaces will be used exclusively by honest parties while public interfaces will be used by adversaries and simulators.) We write M P if an ITM M has access to the private interfaces of P and write M Ppub if M has access only to the public interfaces of P . If P does not have distinguished public and private interfaces, then the public interfaces are just the private interfaces. We write M P1,P2,... to denote M having access to multiple (independent) ITMs P 1 , P 2 , . . ..
Implicitly this means one defines a single ITM P = (P 1 , P 2 , . . .) with interfaces for the independent functionalities and then give M unfettered access to P . 
κ . Let BC(κ, n) be the set of all such block ciphers. An ideal cipher is the ideal primitive C κ,n = (E, D) with two interfaces implementing a cipher chosen randomly from BC κ,n and its inverse, respectively. We write C when κ and n are clear from context. (Note that in both cases all interfaces are private, and so accessed both by honest parties and adversaries alike.) HASH FUNCTIONS AND MERKLE-DAMGÅRD. Let Dom ⊆ {0, 1}
* be a non-empty set of strings, and Rng be a non-empty set (typically {0, 1} n for some integer n > 0). A hash function is an algorithm that computes a map H : Dom → Rng. We will be concerned with hash functions that use (oracle access to) an underlying ideal primitive P . We write H P when we want to make this dependency explicit. If P has both private and public interfaces, then we use the convention that H P means H uses the first private interface. When the primitive is clear from context, we will sometimes suppress reference to it. When computing Time(H, ·), calls to P are unit cost. Similar to our definition of Time(H, m), we write NumQueries(H, m) for the minimum, over all programs T H that compute H, of the maximum number of queries to P required to compute H P (x) for any x ∈ Dom such that |x| ≤ m.
n a compression function (using idealized primitive P ). Let v 0 = IV be a fixed n-bit string. Then the iteration of f P , denoted by Itr[f P ], is the algorithm 1 that on
. ], and returns v . Let sfpad : {0, 1} * → D + be a suffix-free padding function which returns a suffix-free encoding of M . A suffix-free encoding has the property that for any M, M such that |M | < |M | the string returned by sfpad(M ) is not a suffix of sfpad(M ). (For example, pad an appropriate amount and append an encoding of the length of the message.) Let SMD[f P ] be the algorithm that on input M runs sfpad(M ) and then applies Itr[f P ] to the result.
COLLISION RESISTANCE OF HASH FUNCTIONS. Fix sets Dom ⊆ {0, 1} * and Rng and let A be an adversary that outputs a pair of strings x, x ∈ Dom. Let P be an ideal primitive. To hash function H P : Dom → Rng and adversary A we associate the advantage relation
where the probability is over the coins used by A and primitive P .
THE INDIFFERENTIABILITY FRAMEWORK.
We make extensive use of the indifferentiability framework of Maurer, Renner, and Holenstein [28] , however we follow more closely the formalizations of it appearing in [17, 2, 3] . Let H be some cryptographic scheme (e.g. a hash function) that utilizes an ideal primitive P . Let Q be a second ideal primitive. A simulator, typically denoted by S, is just an ITM revealing some number of interfaces. Informally, we say that H is indifferentiable from Q if there exists an efficient simulator S with an interface for each interface of P pub such that for all "reasonable" adversaries A outputing a bit it is the case that
Q,S,A ⇒ 1 is "small" where the probabilities are taken over the coins used the experiments shown in Figure 1 . In the indiff-1 experiment H uses access to the (first) private interface of P while the adversary A has access to the public interfaces of P . In the indiff-0 experiment the adversary has access to Q's private interfaces while S has access to Q's public interfaces. Note that a crucial aspect of the framework is that the simulator, while able to query Q pub itself, does not get to see the queries made by the adversary to Q priv .
We shall formalize several security notions, based on the reference primitive Q that the scheme is compared against (e.g. see below). A key benefit of using indifferentiability is the composition theorem detailed in [28] , which states that (intuitively) one can securely use H P instead of Q in applications.
PSEUDORANDOM ORACLES. Fix non-empty sets Dom, Rng. Let P be an ideal primitive and let F Dom,Rng be a random
Ret b Figure 1 : Experiments used in the indifferentiability framework for scheme H, adversary A, and ideal primitives P and Q.
oracle Ex(z): oracle. We define the pro advantage of an adversary A against a function H P mapping from Dom to Rng by
Preimage Awareness
Suppose H is a hash function built from an (ideal) primitive P . We seek to, roughly speaking, capture a notion which states that an adversary who knows a "later useful" output z of H P must "already know" (be aware of) a particular corresponding preimage x. We can capture the spirit of this notion using a deterministic algorithm called an extractor. Consider the following experiment. An adversary A outputs a range point z, possibly after interacting with an oracle for P . The extractor is then run on two inputs: z and an advice string α. The latter contains a description of all of A's queries so far to P and the corresponding responses. The extractor outputs a value x in the domain of H. Then A continues and attempts to output a preimage x such that H P (x ) = z but x = x . Informally speaking, if no adversary can do so with high probability, then we consider H to be preimage aware. We now turn to formalizing a notion based on this intuition, but which allows multiple, adaptive attempts by the adversary to fool the extractor.
Fix sets Dom ⊆ {0, 1} * and Rng, and let A be an adversary that outputs a string x ∈ Dom. In the preimage awareness (pra) experiment defined in Figure 2 , the adversary is provided with two oracles. First, an oracle P that provides access to the (ideal) primitive P , but which also records all the queries and their responses in an advice string α. (We assume that when P is providing an interface to multiple primitives, it is clear from the advice string to which primitive each query was made.) Second, an extraction oracle Ex. The extraction oracle provides an interface to an extractor E, which is a deterministic algorithm that takes as input a point z ∈ Rng and the advice string α, and returns a point in Dom ∪ {⊥}.
For hash function H, adversary A, and extractor E, we define the advantage relation Adv pra H,P, E (A) = Pr Exp pra H,P, E,A ⇒ true where the probabilities are over the coins used in running the experiments. We will assume that an adversary never asks a query outside of the domain of the queried oracle. We use the convention that the running time of the adversary A does not include the time to answer its queries (i.e. queries are unit cost). When there exists an efficient extractor E such that Adv pra H,P, E (A) is small for all reasonable adversaries A, we say that the hash function H is preimage aware (PrA). (Here "efficient", "small", and "reasonable" are meant informally.) REMARKS. As mentioned, the above formalization allows multiple, adaptive challenge queries to the extraction oracle. This notion turned out to be most convenient in applications. One can instead restrict the above notion to a single query (or to not allow adaptivity) resulting in a definition with slightly simpler mechanics. In Appendix D we discuss such an alternative formulation of preimage awareness.
Relationships between PrA, CR, and Random Oracles
Our new notion preimage awareness is an interesting middle point in the continuum between objects that are CR (on one end) and those that are random oracles (on the other). More formally speaking, we will show momentarily that a PrA function is also CR, and that a random oracle is PrA. The second point is fairly obvious, but the first is quite interesting. In particular, we will see in Section 4 that a PrA function is a secure domain extender for fixed-input-length random oracles, unlike CR functions [17] . (This already suggests that CR does not necessarily imply PrA.). Preimage awareness is consequently a very useful strengthening of CR, not to mention that it provides rigor to the folklore intuition that CR functions are insufficient for this application due to a lack of extractability. What is more, the MD transform preserves preimage awareness. This is in stark contrast to the fact that MD (even if one uses strengthening) does not preserve indifferentiability from a random oracle (i.e. PRO-Pr)
Let us begin with the formal results. One can view preimage awareness as a strengthening of collision resistance in the following way. Say that queries to P allow the adversary to compute distinct domain points x, x such that H P (x) = H P (x ) = z. The adversary can make an extraction query on z, and then succeed in the PrA game by returning whichever of x and x is not extracted from (z, α) by the extractor.
Theorem 3.1 [PrA⇒CR]
Let P be an ideal primitive and H P : Dom → Rng be a hash function. Let E be an arbitrary extractor. Let A be a CR adversary against H asking a total of q p queries to P . Then there exists a PrA adversary B such that
. B runs in time that of A plus O(q p ) + Time(H), asks at most q p primitive queries, and one extraction query.
Proof: The PrA adversary B starts by running A, using its oracle P to answer A's oracle queries. Eventually, A halts with output of two messages x 0 , x 1 . When it does, let B compute z ← H P (x 0 ). Then let B make the single query x ← Ex(z).
On the other hand, it is not hard to see that a RO is a PrA function. The following theorem captures this, and its proof is in Appendix A. * and n > 0, let P = RF Dom,n Then the hash function H P (x) = P (x) is preimage-aware. Specifically, there exists an extractor E such that for all adversaries A making at most q e queries to P and q e extraction queries
Moreover, the running time of the extractor is O(q) .
Weak Preimage Awareness
Our proofs of preimage-awareness will be aided by considering a related notion that we call weak preimage awareness (WPrA) We define WPrA simply by modifying the pra experiment of Figure 2 so that the extractor, when queried on an image z, can return a set of potential preimages (instead of just a single preimage). The adversary wins if it can output a preimage x such that H(x) = z yet x is not in the set returned by the extractor. While this weakening of PrA no longer implies CR, it will be useful for evaluating functions already proven CR.
Fix sets Dom and Rng. A multi-point extractor E + is a deterministic algorithm that takes input a point z ∈ Rng and outputs a set X ⊆ Dom. Formally, let Exp wpra H,P, E + ,A work exactly like Exp pra H,P, E + ,A except that the last line of the pra experiment (see Figure 2 ) is changed to "
Then we associate to any hash function H, adversary A, and set extractor E the advantage relation
We say that a multi-point extractor E + is honest if for any z ∈ Rng and advice string α it is the case that
where the probability is taken over the coins used by P . We will sometimes restrict attention to honest multi-point extractors.
Note that this is not, in general, without loss, since E does not have oracle access to P . However it will be easy to verify that extractors we construct are honest.
We can simplify some of our proofs with the following easy, but useful, results. First, WPrA when allowing only a single query (denoted 1-WPrA) implies WPrA with many queries. The proof (omitted) is by straightforward hybrid argument. Second, and more interestingly, we give a lemma showing that any function that is both CR and WPrA is also PrA. These lemmas greatly simplify some of proofs, because together they reduce the task of showing a CR function fully preimage-aware to showing that it meets the WPrA definition for a single extraction query.
Lemma 3.3 [1-WPrA ⇒ WPrA] Let P be an ideal primitive and H P : Dom → Rng be a hash function. Let E + be a multi-point extractor. Let A be an adversary making at most q e extraction queries and running in time t. Then there exists an PrA adversary B, asking at most one extraction query, such that Adv wpra H,P, E + (A) ≤ q e ·Adv wpra H,P, E + (B) . B runs in time at most t + O(q e · Time(E + )) and makes the same number of P queries queries as A.
Lemma 3.4 [WPrA + CR ⇒ PrA] Let P be an ideal primitive and H P : Dom → Rng be a hash function. Let E + be an arbitrary honest multi-point extractor. Then there exists an extractor E such that for any pra-adversary A making q e extraction queries there exists wpra-adversary B and cr-adversary C such that
B makes the same number of queries as A and runs in time that of A plus O(q e ). C asks q p queries and runs in time t + q e ·Time(E + ). E runs in the same time as E + .
Proof: Let E be the extractor that, on input (z, α) runs X ← E + (z, α) and outputs the first element in X . Let B be a WPAadversary that works as follows. It runs A, just forwarding oracle queries to P and E + , returning P -responses directly to A and simulating E using the responses of E + . Let B output whatever A does.
In the event space defined by Exp pra H,P, E,A let Coll denote the event that E + outputs a set of size larger than one. Then its
for the natural adversary C because E + is honest. Note that until event Coll occurs the execution of Exp pra H,P, E,A is identical that of Exp pra H,P, E + ,B . Therefore,
implying the theorem statement.
Merkle-Damgård as an FIL-RO domain extender
In this section we develop a main result: that an MD-hash is a good domain extender for an FIL random oracle. We do this in two steps. First, in Theorem 4.1 we prove a generic result that any PrA function is a good domain extender for an FIL random oracle. This is interesting in itself, because until now no property weaker than being a PRO is known to be sufficient for extending the domain of an FIL-RO; in particular, CR is not sufficient [17] . In the second step, Theorem 4.2, we prove that Merkle-Damgård (with strengthening) yields a VIL-PrA hash function when the underlying compression function is a FIL-PrA function.
Theorem 4.1 [RO domain extension via PrA] Let P be an ideal primitive and H P : Dom → Rng be a hash function. Let R be an ideal primitive with two interfaces that implements independent functionalities P and R = RF Rng,Rng . Define
. Let E be an arbitrary extractor for H. Then there exists a simulator S = (S 1 , S 2 ) such that for any PRO adversary A making at most (q 0 , q 1 , q 2 ) queries to its three oracle interfaces, there exists a PrA adversary B such that
Simulator S runs in time O(q 1 + q 2 ·Time(E)). Let max the the length (in bits) of the longest query made by A to it's first oracle. Adversary B runs in time that of A plus O(q 0 · Time(H, max ) + q 1 + q 2 ), makes q 1 + q 0 · NumQueries(H, max ) primitive queries, q 2 extraction queries, and outputs a preimage of length at most max .
Proof: Let E be an arbitrary extractor for H. Then S = (S 1 , S 2 ) works as follows. It maintains an internal advice string α (initially empty) that will consist of pairs (u, v) corresponding to A's queries to P (via S 1 ). When A queries u to S 1 the simulator simulates u ← P (v) appropriately, sets α ← α (u, v), and returns v. For a query Y to S 2 , the simulator runs X ← E(Y, α). If X = ⊥ then the simulator returns a random point. Otherwise it queries Z ← F(X) and returns Z to the adversary.
Consider the experiments of the PRO definition, that is A interacting with oracle interfaces
Informally, there are only three events that adversary A can cause that will allow it to distinguish between these settings (due to S failing to simulate properly):
(2) if A makes a query O 2 (Y ) and the extractor at this point retrieves
Furthermore, each case implies that A has forced a situation that leads to contradicting the preimage awareness of H.
To formalize these observations, we utilize the four games shown in Figure 3 . Game R0 implements the oracles (F, P, R) using a table R to simulate the random oracle R. Note that the simulation is such that none of the oracle procedures query each other (unlike the obvious implementation of F, P, R). Included in R0 is some extra "book-keeping" code, such as a We modify games R0 and I1 to derive, respectively, games G0 and G1. Game G0, which includes the boxed statements, modifies the way in which R is simulated. In particular, the R 
. Since G0 and G1 are identical-until-bad, we can apply the fundamental lemma of game-playing [2] , which establishes that
One can see that if any of the three events discussed above occur, then bad will necessarily be set. (We justify this in detail in a moment.) We will bound the probability of bad being set by building an PrA adversary B against H. The adversary B is detailed in Figure 3 . It executes A G1 , except that usage of P is replaced by queries to B's primitive oracle P, usage of E is replaced by queries to B's extraction oracle Ex, and if bad is set B halts and outputs a preimage of H. We now argue that
We consider each location at which bad can be set, justifying that the output point leads to B's success in the PrA experiment.
• Line 04: Setting bad here corresponds to event 2 discussed informally above. Let j be the value of i when bad is set. Then, the conditional on line 03 implies that there exists a value i < j for which a point Y 2,i = Y 0,j was defined and for which X 2,i = ⊥. Thus, outputting X 2,j is a satisfying preimage: H P (X 2,j ) = Y 2,i and Y 2,i was queried to Ex and the value returned was not equal to X 2,j .
• Line 06: Setting bad here corresponds to either event 1 or event 2 discussed informally above. Let j be the value of i when bad is set. Then, the conditional on line 05 implies that there exists a value i < j for which a point Y w,i = Y 0,j where w ∈ {0, 2}. In the case that w = 0, then a non-trivial collision against H P has been found:
. Adversary B can finish by querying Y 0,j to Ex and then outputting whichever one of X 0,i , X 0,j is not returned. In the case that w = 2, then the previous query i was to O 2 , and the point X 2,i returned by Ex is not the same as X 0,j . Thus a second preimage of Y 0,j has been found and can be output by B.
• Line 24: Setting bad here corresponds to event 3 discussed informally above. Let j be the value of i when bad is set. Then, the conditional on line 23 implies that there exists a value i < j for which a point Y 0,i = Y 2,j and that X 0,i = X 2,j . Thus the two preimages of Y 0,i have been found, and B can output X 0,i to win.
In all cases we see that B succeed, justifying (2) . Moreover, it is clear how to efficiently implement the Finish() routine (omitted from Figure 3 for simplicity).
procedure O 0 (X):
Run A O0,O2,O3 , answering queries by: The tables Q and E, which record if a value was queried to Ex and the value returned by the query, are initially everywhere ⊥.
The extractor E H works exactly the same as the code of SimEx except that queries to Ex are replaced by directly running E h and the tables Q and E can be omitted. Loosely, extractor E H , when queried on a challenge image z, uses E h to compute (backwards) the preimages of each iteration of h leading to z. When a chaining variable equal to IV is extracted, the function unpad is applied to the extracted message blocks. If it succeeds, then the result is returned.
Note that we reverse the (usual) order of indices for message blocks and chaining variables (starting high and counting down, e.g. m * · · · m * 1 ) for both the extractor and B due to the extractor working backwards. To lower bound B's advantage by the advantage of A we first point out that, by construction of E H , the values returned by the simulated SimEx are distributed identically to the values returned during execution of Exp pra H,P,E H ,A . Thus we have that Adv
where the event "m * satisfies", defined over the experiment Exp pra h,P, E B ,B , occurs when the message m * satisfies the conditions of winning for A. Namely that H P (m * ) was queried to SimEx and the reply given was not equal to m * . We call m * a satisfying preimage for A. We will show that whenever m * is a satisfying preimage for A, with m
, there exists a k with 1 ≤ k ≤ for which adversary B returns (v * k+1 , m * k ) and this pair is a satisfying preimage for B (i.e. one that wins the PrA experiment against h for B). This will establish that
Consider the query SimEx(H P (m * )) necessarily made by A. Let (v j+1 , x j ), . . . , (v 2 , x 1 ) be the sequence of values returned by the Ex queries made by SimEx in the course of responding to A's query. Necessarily 1 ≤ j ≤ max and 1 ≤ ≤ max .
We will show that there exists a k such that 1 ≤ k ≤ min{j, } and (v k+1 , x k ) = (v * k+1 , m * k ). (This includes the possibility that v k+1 = ⊥ and x k = ⊥.) First we use this fact to conclude. Since k ≤ j it means that v k was queried to Ex. If Recall that if a compression function h is both CR and hard to invert for range point the IV , then the iteration of h is a CR function [18, 22] . We prove an analogous theorem for Itr[h] and preimage awareness in Appendix B. This is particularly useful in our context, because for the compression functions we will consider (e.g. a FIL random oracle or an ideal cipher based compression function) it is easy to verify that it is difficult to invert a fixed range point. Note that this extra property on h (difficulty of inverting IV ) is, in fact, necessary for iteration (without strengthening) to provide preimage awareness (analogously, collision-resistance).
Building Preimage-Aware Functions
The results of Section 4 allow us to more elegantly and modularly prove that a hash function construction is a pseudorandom oracle (PRO). Particularly, Theorems 4.1 and 4.2 mean that the task of building a PRO is reduced to the task of building a compression function that is PrA. For example, in the case that the compression function is itself suitable to model as an FIL-RO, then it is trivially PrA and so one is finished. However, even if the compression function has some nontrivial structure, such as when based on a block cipher, it is still (relatively) straightforward to prove (suitable compression functions) are PrA. In the rest of this section we show that most CR functions built from an ideal primitive are, in fact, PrA.
Are there applications of preimage awareness beyond analysis of hash functions? We believe the answer is yes. For example, one might explore applications of CR functions, instead analyzing these applications assuming a PrA function. (As one potential application, the CR-function using statistically hiding commitment scheme of [19] conceivably achieves straight-line extractability given instead a PrA function.) We leave such explorations to future work.
PrA FOR CR CONSTRUCTIONS. There is a long line of research [31, 7, 25, 26, 34, 35, 33, 21] on building compression functions (or full hash functions) that are provably collision-resistant in some idealized model, e.g. the ideal-cipher model. We show that in many cases one can generalize these results to showing the constructions are also PrA. In the rest of this section we show that the Davies-Meyer and other so-called "group-1" PGV compression functions [31, 7] are not only CR but PrA. We also give bounds on the PrA-security of the Shrimpton-Stam compression function [35] , the Dodis-PietrzakPuniya compression function [21] , and the first two steps of the MCM construction [32] . Previously these constructions were only known to be CR.
CR compression functions from PGV are preimage-aware
Let us begin with block-cipher-based compression functions. Sixty-four schemes, including Davies-Meyer and MMO, were considered by Preneel et al. [31] , and twelve of these were later proven to be optimally collision-resistant and preimageresistant (in the ideal-cipher model) by Black et al. [7] ; these were labeled as "group-1". Another group of eight "group-2" compression functions were found to be optimally collision resistant in the iteration (and preimage resistant in the iteration up to the birthday bound) despite not being collision or preimage resistant themselves. Subsequently, Stam [37] gave an alternative classification of these schemes based on a more general analysis of rate-1 block-cipher-based compression functions. He considered compression functions that, on input a chaining variable v ∈ {0, 1} n and message block m ∈ {0, 1} d , operate as follows:
where
n are functions called preprocessing and postprocessing, respectively. He also defined an auxillary post-processing function (1) C pre is bijective, (2) for all v, m the mapping C post (v, m, ·) is bijective, and (3) for all k, y the mapping C aux (k, ·, y) is bijective.
When they exist, we let C −pre denote the inverse of C pre , C −post (v, m, ·) denote the inverse of C post (v, m, ·), and C −aux (k, ·, y) denote the inverse of C aux (k, ·, y). As it turns out, the twelve "group-1" compression functions are also "Type-I". We leverage Stam's results here to show that the group-1/Type-I PGV compression functions are preimage aware. In Appendix C we discuss the group-2 PGV functions, showing these build preimage aware hash functions when used within an iteration. (There too we leverage Stam's generalized framework and results.) Theorem 5.1 [The Group-1/Type-I PGV schemes are PrA] Fix κ, n > 0, let C κ,n = (E, D) be an ideal cipher and let H C be a Type-I block-cipher-based compression function. There exists an extractor E such that for any adversary A making at most q p queries to C and q e extraction queries we have
where E runs in time at most O(q p (Time(C −pre ) + Time(C post ))).
Proof: We will prove that any such compression function is 1-WPrA-secure, and then use Lemmas 3.3 and 3.4 to give the final bound. We note that Theorem 5 of [37] upperbounds the collision-finding advantage of A by q p (q p + 1)/2(2 n − q p ), yielding the second term above.
Let us define the extractor E as follows:
Note that because C pre is a bijection, a pair (v i , m i ) is uniquely determined by a pair (k i , x i ). Intuitively, E simply iterates over the query-response triples and searches for ideal-cipher queries (k, x, y) that would produce z under the compression function. Upon finding them, it adds the corresponding (unique) compression function input (v, m) to the preimage list. Thus all preimages of z that can be determined from the query list α are returned, and if A wins the 1-WPrA experiment, it must find find a new preimage of z. Then one can straightforwardly adapt Stam's results (specifically, the proof of [37, Th. 6] ) to show that the probability of this occuring is at most q/(2 n − q).
Shrimpton-Stam compression function is preimage-aware
Next we show that it is possible to build a PrA compression function from non-compressing random functions 2 . In particular, we examine the compression function recently designed by Shrimpton and Stam [35] . They proved that their compression function is nearly optimally collision resistant (i.e. to the birthday bound), and we will now show that it is also PrA.
Then there exists an extractor E such that for any adversary A making q p queries to each of f 1 , f 2 , f 3 and q e extraction queries, we have Adv pra H,f1,f2,f3, E (A) ≤ (n + 3)q p q e 2 n + (3n + 13)q e 2 n + q Before proving the theorem, we first remark that this bound is conservative in several ways as it uses a hybrid argument and several upperbound approximations to facilitate the proof. With additional effort it is possible that, in particular, the third term in the bound can be tightened a bit.
Proof:
We proceed by reasoning about the single-extractor-query WPrA experiment, and then applying Lemmas 3.3 and 3.4 and the collision resistance bound from [35] to get the final result. For convenience, we write q everywhere for q p (this should cause no confusion as we assume only one extraction query).
We will assume that the advice string has the format α = r , (a 1 , u 1 
where u i = f 1 (a i ), v i = f 2 (b i ) and y i = f 3 (x i ), with i over the indicated indices in each case. We now define the (honest) multi-point extractor E + . Let L 1 and L 2 be initialized to the empty set.
Parse α as r , (a 1 , u 1 ) , . . . , (a r , u r ), s , y 1 ) , . . . , (x t , y t )
We note that by construction the extractor returns L 2 (i.e. not ⊥) only when all (a, b) ∈ L 2 are preimages of z; thus the extractor is honest. Moreover, this extractor returns all preimages of z that can be computed from the advice string. For A to win the WPrA experiment, it must find a new (possibly first) preimage for z. Without loss, we assume that A outputs a new preimage as soon as one can be computed. Thus there are three cases to consider, namely that A's winning (final) query is to f 1 , f 2 or f 3 . f 1 query. Consider the case that the winning query is to f 1 , and let u * be the returned value for that query. Since this is the last query, we can assume that all f 2 and f 3 queries have already been made. Let V be the list of f 2 responses. Let F 3 be the list of f 3 query-pairs (x i , y i ), and for convenience let X and Y be the lists of x i and y i , respectively (order maintained relative to the order in F 3). If u * is one of the q − 1 previously returned f 1 values, then we can assume without loss that A has found a new preimage of z. (This follows because this is assumed to be the final and winning query.) But this happens with probability at most (q − 1)/2 n . So we proceed under the assumption that u * does not collide with a previous f 1 response. Consider the multiset u * ⊕ Y = {u * ⊕ y i : y i ∈ Y }. For u * to be winning for A, the target z must appear in this multiset, and this will happen for any y i = z ⊕ u * . For any fixed c ∈ {0, 1} n , the probability that there are at least n strings y ∈ Y (which are q uniform, independent strings) such that y = z ⊕ c is at most 2 −n . This follows from a Chernoff bound under the assumption that q ≤ n2 n /6, which is at least 2 n/2 for all n claimed by the theorem. So under the assumption that q ≤ 2 n/2 , we can assume that there are at most n pairs (x i , y i ) such that y i = z ⊕ u * , this holding except with probability at most 2 −n . (The upperbound on q will ultimately be dropped as the collision-resistance bound, and hence the PrA bound, will be vacuous for q > 2 n/2 .) Now, for each x i ∈ X, define a set S i = {x i ⊕ v : v ∈ V }. (These were already determined at the time of the final f 1 query.) Let S = i∈I S i where I is the set of indices i such that y i ⊕ u * = z. Clearly |S| ≤ nq, so u * ∈ S with probability at most nq/2 n . Putting it all together, the probabilty that A wins with an f 1 query is at most
f 2 query. Consider the case that the winning query is to f 2 , and let v * be the returned value for that query. Again, since this is the last query, we can assume that all f 1 and f 3 queries have already been made. Let F 3, X and Y be as in the previous case. As before, if v * collides with a previously returned f 2 query, then we can assume that the adversary has found a new preimage of z; this happens with probability at most (q − 1)/2 n . Now, consider the q distinct values of v * ⊕ X = {v * ⊕ x i : x i ∈ X}. (These are distinct because the x i are.) Since v * is winning only if some previously defined f 1 -response u is in v * ⊕ X, we will assume that for each of the q strings in v * ⊕ X there is such a u; thus, by a union bound, we want to upperbound
. But each probability in the sum is over the uniform v * , so this sum is at most q/2 n . In total then, the probability that A wins with an f 2 query is at most
f 3 query. Consider the case that the winning query is to f 3 , and let y * be the returned value for that query. As before, we can assume that all f 1 and f 2 queries have been made, and we let U and V be the corresponding multisets of responses. Let N c be the number of times that c ∈ {0, 1} n appears in the multiset U ⊕ V = {u ⊕ v : u ∈ U, v ∈ V }. We assume for the moment that, for all c, N c ≤ 3n except with some (small) probability that we will bound in a moment. Then the final f 3 query yields at most 3n opportunities for y * ⊕ u = z to hold, so that y * is winning with probability at most 3n/2 n .
It remains to bound Pr[N c > 3n], which we do by bounding Pr[N c ≥ 3n]. Notice that the elements of U and V are independent of adversarial choices, so this is a strictly combinatorial problem. In addition, that the elements in U are independent of those in V , so the order in which these lists are populated is irrelevant from the point of view of the event N c ≥ 3n for any value of c. So we assume that q elements in U are selected, and then we begin to fill in V . Let us assume that there are no 4-way collisions in U , which holds except with probability at most
where in the final inequality we have assumed that q ≤ 2 n/2 . Now, under the assumption that U contains no 4-way collisions, each element assigned to V increases N c by at most 3 for any c ∈ {0, 1} n . Thus if N c ≥ 3n for some c, it must be the case that at least n values of v increase N c . The probability that some value of v increases N c (equivalently that v = u ⊕ c for some u ∈ U ) is at most q/2 n . Thus by a union bound
So assuming that q ≤ 2 n/2 , the probability that A wins on an f 3 query is at most
Summary. Pulling together all of our cases, the probability that A manages to find a new preimage for z in our singleextractor-query WPrA experiment is at most (n + 1)q 2 n + 1 2 n + 2q 2 n + 3n 2 n + 12 2 n = (n + 3)q 2 n + 3n + 13 2 n By Lemma 3.3, we multiply through by q e to get the bound for the multiple-extractor-query case. Finally, we use Lemma 3.4 and the collision resistance bound from [35] . The latter states that for all n > 0 and k, q ≥ 0 the probability of finding a collision is at most
Now we determine an upperbound on q (as a function of k, n) such that the last line above is at most 1/2 n . This means
Setting k = 2n and taking logarithms (base 2),
Since n log(n) ≤ log(2n!) for all n, we can use the more conservative bound
Now is can be shown that for n > 3 log(n) 4
Thus if n > 3 and log(q) ≤ (n − 1)/2, or equivalently q ≤ 2 (n−1)/2 , we have P q,2n,n ≤ 1/2 n . This yields a collision bound of
(n−1)/2 we can see that
, without the addition of P q,2n,n ), so we can drop the restriction on q. This completes the proof.
Dodis-Pietrzak-Puniya compression function is preimage-aware
Dodis et al. [21] also offer a compression function from non-compressing primitives, this being f (c,
A straightforward extension of the argument in [21] shows that this function is PrA for ideal f 1 and f 2 .
Theorem 5.3 [DPP is PA]
Fix n > 0. Let f 1 , f 2 be independent random oracles F n,n and let H f1,f2 (c, m) = f 1 (c) ⊕ f 2 (m). Then, there exists an extractor E such that for any adversary A making at most q 1 , q 2 queries to f 1 , f 2 and makes at most q e extraction queries, we have
E runs in time O(q 1 q 2 ).
Proof: Using Lemmas 3.3 and 3.4, it suffices to show that H is CR and also WPrA for 1 extraction query. The former bound was already shown in [21] : for any attacker C, Adv
Next, we prove security relative to the WPrA notion for one extraction query as per Appendix 3.2. We assume that the advice string α is of the form α 1 α 2 where α 1 is a list of query/response pairs made by A to f 1 and α 2 is the list for f 2 . Then let E + be the (honest) multi-point extractor that works as shown below.
algorithm E + (z, α 1 α 2 ):
Now suppose that A did not query at least one of f 1 or f 2 before making the extract query z (otherwise E + would extract it). Now, each such new query c j = c to f 1 can define at most q 2 new values z i = f 1 (c ) ⊕ f 2 (x i ). Since f 1 (c ) is random, the chance that z i is equal to z is at most 2 −n , so the total probability that f 1 (c ) would define some value z i = z is at most q 2 /2 n . Symmetrically, the total probability that a new query x i = x to f 2 would produce a new value
n . Taking the union bound over all such new queries, the total probability of obtaining a value z = f 1 (c j ) ⊕ f 2 (x i ) (for some i and j) is at most 2q 1 q 2 /2 n . If no such value is found, the chance that the value (c, x) output by the attacker is equal to z is at most 2 −n . Combining these bounds, for any attacker B, Adv
Combining, we get that for any A, Adv pra H,f1,f2,E (A) ≤ (q 2 1 q 2 2 + 2q 1 q 2 q e + q e )/2 n .
Mix-Compress is preimage-aware
We show that the "mix-compress" portion of the "mix-compress-mix" construction from [32] is PrA as long as the compress step is CR and relatively balanced. First we must define a measure of balance. Associated to any function F : {0, 1} * → {0, 1} n is the set PreIm F ( , z) = {y | y ∈ {0, 1} * ∧ |y| = ∧ F (y) = z} for all > 0 and z ∈ {0, 1} n . That is, PreIm F ( , z) contains the length preimages of z under F . We also define the function
related to F . The δ F function measures how far a particular preimage set deviates from the case in which F is regular. Let ∆ F = max{δ F ( , z)}, where the maximum is taken over all choices of and z. Second, we let F * ,τ to be the ideal primitive that, on input x ∈ {0, 1} * returns a randomly chosen string y ∈ {0, 1} |x|+τ .
Theorem 5.4 [Mix-Compress is
PrA.] Fix τ, n > 0, let F : {0, 1} * → {0, 1} n and let F * ,τ be the ideal primitive defined above. Let H F (m) = F (F(m)) be the hash with minimum accepted message length ν ≥ n − τ if n > τ and ν ≥ τ if n < τ . There exists an extractor E such that for any pra-adversary A making q p primitive queries and q e extraction queries there exists a CR adversary B such that
E runs in time at most O(q p ). B runs in time at most that of A plus O(q p ).
The restricted domain in the theorem statement (inherited from [32] ) ensures that inputs to F have size at least n bits.
Proof: We prove the WPrA notion for one extraction query and then apply Lemmas 3.3 and 3.4. Let E + be the (honest) multi-point extractor that works as shown below.
algorithm E + (z, α):
Assume that before the single extractor query no previous query to F by the adversary led to a point y in the preimage set (under F ) of the challenge point z (otherwise the extractor will have succeeded for z). Then we must bound the probability that a new query to F results in a point y for which F (y) = z. If F for each message length is regular then any new random value y has probability 2 −n of being mapped to z under F , and so we could finish with bound q p /2 n . Instead we do something slightly more general using the definitions of PreIm F , δ F , and ∆ F defined above. Choose ∈ N (such that − τ ≥ ν, the minimum message length of H) and z ∈ {0, 1} n to maximize |PreIm F ( , z)|. Then the optimal strategy for A is to first query z to its extraction oracle and only make queries to F of length − τ . (Primitive queries before the extraction query will only lower A's advantage, since any successful ones will be known to the extractor.) The result of these queries is q p random -bit strings, call these y 1 , . . . , y qp . Then we have that
where the events are defined in the natural manner. In deriving equality (5) we apply (4) (ignoring the absolute values, since |PreIm F ( , z)| ≥ 2 −n due to our maximization). Then applying Lemma 3.3 gives a factor q e to the right hand side of this bound. We apply Lemma 3.4 and this gives our theorem statement.
Indifferentiability for Public-Use Random Oracles
In numerous applications, hash functions are applied only to public messages. Such public-use occurs in most signature schemes (e.g. full-domain-hash [4] , probabilistic FDH [16] , Fiat-Shamir [24] , BLS [10] , PSS [6] ) and even some encryption schemes (e.g. a variant of Boneh-Franklin IBE [14] and Boneh-Boyen IBE [8] ). It is easy to verify that the provable security of such schemes is retained even if all hashed messages are revealed to adversaries. We introduce the notion of a public-use random oracle (pub-RO). This is an ideal primitive that exposes two interfaces: one which performs the usual evaluation of a random oracle on some domain point and a second which reveals all so-far evaluated domain points. All parties have access to the first interface, while access to the latter interface will only be used by adversaries (and simulators).
A wide class of schemes that have proofs of security in the traditional random oracle model can easily be shown secure in this public-use random oracle model. Consider any scheme and security experiment for which all messages queried to a RO can be inferred from an adversary's queries (and their responses) during the experiment. Then one can prove straightforwardly the scheme's security in the pub-RO model, using an existing proof in the full RO model as a "black box". For example, these conditions are met for unforgeability under chosen-message attacks of signature schemes that use the RO on messages and for message privacy of IBE schemes that use the RO on adversarially-chosen identities. All the schemes listed in the previous paragraph (and others) fall into these categories.
The pub-RO model was independently considered by Yoneyama et al. [39] (there called the leaky random oracle model) under different motivation. They directly prove some schemes secure when hash functions are modeled as a monolithic pub-RO. They do not analyze the underlying structure of iterative hash functions.
We next utilize the indifferentiability framework of Maurer et al. [28] to formalize a new notion of security for hash constructions: indifferentiability from a public-use RO, which we will call being a public-use pseudorandom oracle (pub-PRO). This new security property is weaker than that of being a PRO, but nevertheless enjoys the indifferentiability framework's composibility guarantees [28] .
Public-use ROs and PROs
Fix sets Dom, Rng. A public-use random oracle (pub-RO) is an ideal primitive F Dom,Rng = ((F eval ), (F eval , F reveal )) defined as follows. Let ρ be a random function Dom → Rng. The (private and public) evaluation interface F eval , on input M ∈ Dom, first adds the pair (M, ρ(M )) to an initially-empty set Q and then returns ρ(M ). The (public) reveal interface F reveal takes no input and returns Q (suitably encoded into a string). Figure 4 details a pub-RO in code. We say that F Dom,Rng is a fixed-input-length (FIL) pub-RO if Dom only includes messages of a single length. We write F n×d,n for the FIL pub-RO with domain Dom = {0, 1} n × {0, 1} d and Rng = {0, 1} n . As usual, we write just F when Dom and Rng are clear from context.
INDIFFERENTIABILITY FROM A pub-RO. Let H P : Dom → Rng be a hash function using an ideal primitive P . Let F Dom,Rng = (F eval , (F eval , F reveal )) be a pub-RO. Let S be a simulator with oracle access to (both interfaces of) F. Then we associate to pub-pro adversary A, primitive P , and simulator S the pub-pro advantage function Adv pub-pro
The simulator's ability to call F reveal , thereby seeing all queries so-far-made by A to F eval , is the crucial difference between pub-PRO and PRO. Informally, we say that a construction H is a pub-PRO if there exists an efficient simulator such that all efficient adversaries A have small advantage.
The composition theorem in [28] (recast to use ITMs in [17] ) can be applied to pub-PROs. That is, a cryptographic scheme using a pub-PRO hash construction H P for some ideal primitive P can have its security analyzed in a setting where H P is replaced by a monolithic pub-RO F. In this setting, adversaries attacking the scheme can perform queries to F reveal .
Public-use guarded ROs and PROs
Many "structured" compression functions are easily differentiable from a FIL pub-RO. For example, consider the following attack against DM, due to [38] . Let A against DM E (v, m) = E m (v) ⊕ v work as follows. It picks a random y and m and then queries its third oracle interface (in the "real" setting this would be E −1 ) on m, y. When interacting with the pub-RO
Ret Q Figure 4 : (Left) The pub-RO ideal primitive F Dom,Rng = (F eval , (F eval , F reveal ) ). Initially F is everywhere ⊥ and Q is empty. (Right) The pub-GRO ideal primitive f n×d,n = (f geval , (f eval , f reveal )). Initially f is everywhere ⊥ and W, Q are empty. Here IV ∈ {0, 1} n is a fixed string.
F and any simulator S, we see that S would need to respond with a value v such that F eval (v, m) = y ⊕v. This corresponds to inverting F on some fixed range point, which is hard. (Note that A has not, before querying the simulator, submitted any queries to F.) Thus the adversary will win easily. Nevertheless brief reflection suggests that iterating DM from a fixed IV should result in a pub-PRO. We could try to argue this directly, but instead we introduce another variant of ROs as a technical tool to allow modular proofs. Fix n, d > 0 and IV ∈ {0, 1} n . A public-use guarded random oracle (pub-GRO) is an ideal primitive f n×d,n = (f geval , (f eval , f reveal )) that works as detailed in Figure 4 . In words, let ρ be a random function from {0,
v is equal to a value previously returned by the interface; it returns ⊥ otherwise. The (public) evaluation interface f eval returns ρ(v, m). The (public) reveal interface reveals all so-far (guarded or not) evaluated points and their associated outputs. This weaker version of a FIL pub-RO will still be sufficient for building a pub-PRO using MD. At the same time, the weakening does allow us to show that structured compression functions (such as Davies-Meyers) are indifferentiable from a pub-GRO (even though they are not pub-PROs).
n be a FIL hash function using ideal primitive P . Let f n×d,n = (f geval , (f eval , f reveal )) be a pub-GRO. Let S be a simulator with oracle access to (all interfaces of) f . Then we associate to pub-gpro-adversary A, h, P , and S the pub-gpro advantage function
We stress that in the second probability experiment, while A has access only to f geval , the simulator S has oracle access to f eval and f reveal . Informally, we say that a construction h is a pub-GPRO if there exists an efficient simulator such that all efficient adversaries A have small advantage.
Constructing Public-use Random Oracles
In this section we first show that iterating a FIL public-use RO (or public-use guarded RO) results in an object indifferentiable from a monolithic public-use RO. Then we go on to show that common constructions of compression functions are, in fact, indifferentiable from public-use guarded ROs. In particular we show that the Stam Type-II PGV functions are pub-GROs. Since Davies-Meyers is one such function, these results together imply that the structure of existing hash functions (such as SHA-2) is sound for public-use applications.
procedure S eval (v, m): 
Iteration preserves being a pub-PRO
We show that iteration preserves the property of being a pub-PRO. In fact we show something slightly stronger. Given a compression function that is (indifferentiable from) a public-use guarded RO, iterating this compression function results in a pub-PRO. In the following theorem we write
where g is defined by calling f geval on its input and returning the result. We note that in the computation of Itr[g f geval ] the input to f geval is always either the IV or a valid chaining value. n . Let f n×d,n = (f geval , (f eval , f reveal )) be a pub-GRO and let Itr[f geval ] be the iteration of f geval . There exists a simulator S = (S eval , S reveal ) so that for any adversary A Adv pub-pro
2 n where q 0 is the maximal number of queries by A to its first oracle, these of length at most σ blocks of d bits, and q 1 is the maximal number of queries by A to its f eval /S eval interface. Let q 2 be the number of queries by A to its f reveal /S reveal interface. Then S runs in time that of A plus O(q 0 σ(q 1 + q 2 )) and makes at most q 0 σ + 2q 1 + q 2 queries.
Proof: We specify a simulator S = (S eval , S reveal ) in Figure 5 . Recall that S must emulate only the two public interfaces of a public-use guarded RO. To do this, it utilizes a subroutine update() which uses S's access to F reveal () to simulate a compression function by defining chaining variables in terms of appropriate outputs of F eval . That is, for any sequence of message m queried to F geval (or F eval ) parsed into message blocks m 1 . . . , m , the simulator defines compression function input/output pairs ((v i−1 , m i ), v i ) for 1 ≤ i ≤ where v 0 = IV and v i is assigned the output of F eval (m 1 · · · m i ). The tables V and F are used to maintain this simulation (these tables are initially everywhere ⊥). Queries to S eval not associated (via the chaining variable input) with a valid sequence of message blocks have random values returned as output.
Intuitively, S will succeed as long as no two outputs of F eval collide (which would mean S might fail to use the correct sequence of message blocks when assigning a chaining value) or if the adversary queries some value v, m to S eval for which V[v] = ⊥, yet later one of the chaining variables (an output of F eval ) is assigned the value v. Loosely, the first event will happen with probability at most (q 0 σ+q 1 ) 2 /2 n while the second event will happen with probability at most q 1 (q 0 σ+q 1 )/2 n . We now give a formal argument using the sequences of games G 0 −→ · · · −→ G 6 and G 2 −→ G 2,1 −→ G 2,2 . All games include a procedure O 2 () which returns Q (this was not explicitly included in the pseudocode for brevity). The games are shown in Figures 6 and 7 . We assume that adversary A does not repeat a query to any of its oracles (such queries are pointless).
THE FIRST GAME SEQUENCE. We start by justifying that
We'll later conclude by bounding Pr[A G2 sets bad ] via a sequence of games
(Game G 0 ) By construction, the first game implements exactly the oracles (Itr[f geval ], f eval , f reveal ), justifying (6) . Note that we need not include the explicit checks of the guarded evaluation interface, since the pub-GRO primitive (implemented using Choose-f ) is only used by O 0 to implement Itr.
(Game G 1 , boxed statement included) In game G 1 we modify the way in which queries are handled via some additional book-keeping; as we will see the changes do not modify the implemented functionality. In particular, we establish a table V mapping chaining variable values to sequences of message blocks. MD,S,A while s = 1 will be used for the unrelated random values sometimes returned by the simulator.) Because of the checks, we have that the implemented functionality is the same in G 1 as in G 0 , justifying (7).
(Game G 2 , boxed statement omitted) Games G 1 and G 2 are identical-until-bad, since their only difference is whether or not the boxed statement is included. The fundamental lemma of game playing [2] justifies (8) .
(Game G 3 , boxed statement omitted) Game G 3 dispenses with the extra checks in Choose-f (that, in G 1 ensured consistency between calls with s = 0 and s = 1, but were no longer used in G 2 ). Additionally a set R is added that records all the random choices made in Choose-f . The functionality of G 3 is unchanged from G 2 , justifying (9).
(Game G 4 , boxed statement included) Game G 4 restricts sampling in Choose-f to not allow collisions between any two outputs. Games G 3 and G 4 are identical except for the boxed statement. Since Choose-f can be called a maximum of q 0 σ + q 1 times, we have via a straightforward birthday analysis that . Therefore this change does not affect the execution of the game, and so (11) has been justified.
(Game G 6 , boxed statement omitted) Game G 5 and G 6 are identical except for the boxed statement, and the analysis justifying (10) above also applies to justify (12) . Finally, we argue that G 6 implements oracles that are equivalent to
. In game G 6 the routine Choose-f (0, ·, ·) implements the monolithic random oracle of the indiff-0
Figure 6: Games used in proof of Theorem 7.1. All games also have a procedure O 2 that returns Q (not shown for brevity). experiment (i.e. this implements F eval ). While S uses a subroutine update() to maintain tables V and Q, game G 6 updates these tables directly in response to queries to O 0 or O 1 . However, since S calls update() immediately upon any query to it, the two methods for updating the tables are equivalent. Finally, note that in O 1 when V[v] = ⊥ a freshly-chosen random point is returned, which is equivalent to the implementation of S F eval (recall that A does not make pointless queries). We have justified (13) . UPPER BOUND ON SETTING bad IN G 2 . All that remains is bounding the probability that bad is set in G 2 , which we do with a second sequence of games G 2 −→ G 2,1 −→ G 2,2 . See Figure 7 .
(Game G 2,1 ) This game implements the same functionality as G 2 but changes the way in which bad is set. Now Choose-f records each s, v, m query using the counter j and tuple (s j , v j , m j ). The flag bad is set if there exists a previous execution of Choose-f , let it be the i th execution, such that v i = v j and m i = m j and yet s i = s j . In words, the current v, m query value matches a previous query value, but s does not. Since this is just another way of checking for the same event that caused bad to be set in G 2 , we have that Pr A G2 sets bad = Pr A G2,1 sets bad .
(Game G 2,2 ) We split the setting of bad into two separate cases, represented by the (new) flags bad 1 and bad 2 . The first is the case that the previous query had s = 0 and the later query had s = 1 and the second case is the opposite. A union bound gives that
Pr A G2,1 sets bad ≤ Pr A G2,1 sets bad 1 + Pr A G2,1 sets bad 2 .
Note, however, that the last term is zero. This is true since for bad 2 to be set due to Choose-f (1, v, m) being called from O 1 , it must be the case that V[v] = ⊥. That there exists an i < j for which
This contradiction justifies that bad 2 can never be set. Finally, we bound the probability of bad 1 being set. Let i, j be the numbers such that i < j and (v i , m i ) = (v j , m j ) and s i = 1 and s j = 0. Then it must be the case that V[v i ] = ⊥ at the i th execution of Choose-f . However, at the j th execution it must be the case that
. This means that between the i th and j th calls, the table entry V[v i ] was assigned a value. This can only occur if the output of execution of Choose-f (0, v, m) (for some v, m) equals v i . Combining the facts that all outputs of Choose-f are uniformly chosen and that there are at most q 0 σ + q 1 executions of Choose-f with s = 0, we have that
This concludes the proof.
Type-II PGV are pub-GPROs
It is easy to see that a RO or a pub-RO are indifferentiable from a pub-GRO, and by Theorem 7.1 can therefore be used within an iteration to build a pub-PRO hash function for arbitrary input lengths. However many hash functions (e.g. those built from block ciphers) do not utilize compression functions that are suitable for modeling as a (pub-)RO. In this section we show that many widely-used block-cipher-based compression functions, while not pub-PROs, are indifferentiable from a pub-GRO. As an example to build intuition, recall that an adversary can differentiate DM from a pub-RO by abusing the inverse oracle (see the attack described in Section 6). In the context of pub-GRO, such attacks fail because the adversary cannot query its first oracle with chaining variables not already returned by it. In fact, we prove that any Type-II PGV function (see Section 5.1) is indifferentiable from a pub-GRO. Fix a string IV ∈ {0, 1} n . Let h P be a compression function built using ideal primitive P . Thenh P is the ITM implementing a guarded version of h. Initially a set V is empty. Thenh P (v, m) returns ⊥ if v / ∈ IV ∪ V, and otherwise evalutes h P (v, m) to get value w, adds w to V, and returns w. Then, for example, DM is the guarded version of the Davies-Meyer compression function (defined in Section 2).
We use the guarded versions of compression functions for clarity in our analyses. In particular, the forthcoming results do not rely on implementing guarded versions of compression functions -rather when an unguarded compression function is used within the iteration then only valid v are used with it, meaning our results apply directly. (Formally speaking, we could also just restrict adversaries from querying any inputs which would result in ⊥ being returned, and the guarding logic is superfluous. We choose the explicit approach to render transparent this usage scenario.) Our results do not apply for unguarded compression functions when they are used outside the context of iteration-based hashing.
Recall that the Type-II PGV functions are those for which C pre is a bijection, C post (v, m, ·) is a bijection, and C −pre 1 (k, ·) is a bijection. Here the map C −pre 1
(This is simply the projection of C −pre to its left output.) It is interesting to note that the four Type-I PGV functions that are not also Type-II are not pub-GPRO. Consider the (guarded) MMO compression function MMO E (v, m) = E v (m) ⊕ m built from an ideal cipher C n,n . For any simulator S, we give an adversary that can differentiate MMO from a pub-GRO that works as follows given oracles O 0 , O 1 , and
It chooses arbitrary points y ∈ {0, 1} n and queries O 2 (IV, y) to get reply x. It then queries O 0 (IV, x), retrieves w, and outputs a one if y ⊕ w = x. If in the indiff-1 experiment, the adversary will output one always. In the indiff-0 experiment, S D must respond with a value x such that y ⊕ f (IV, x) = x, lest the adversary will return zero. This can't be done efficiently (since f is a random oracle), and so the adversary will succeed with probability close to one. Similar attacks can be fashioned for the three other only Type-I functions. 3 Intuitively, the Type-II functions resist such attacks because of the third requirement, which ensures that any inverse query corresponds to a (close to) uniform chaining variable. Since uniformly distributed chaining variables are unlikely to ever end up being in the set V of allowed queries to O 0 , the final query of the adversary above wouldn't work for a Type-II function. The next theorem formalizes this, showing that any Type-II PGV function is a pub-GPRO. n . Let C d×n,n = (E, D) be an ideal cipher and leth C be the guarded implementation of a Type-II PGV function h C . There exists a simulator S = (S E , S D ) such that for any adversary A making at most (q 0 , q 1 , q 2 ) queries, we have where S works in time O(q 2 (q 0 + q 1 )) and makes at most q 1 queries.
Proof: We fix the simulator S = (S E , S D ) detailed below.
procedure S E (k, x):
Ret y procedure S D (k, y):
The simulator associates queries by the adversary to S E and S D with queries to f geval . Note that C pre and C post (v, m, ·) are bijections (the latter for any v, m), and their inverses via C −pre and C −post (v, m, ·) (see Section 5.1). The simulator uses these functions to map between inputs and outputs of the block cipher and inputs and outputs of f .
We utilize a sequence of games G 0 −→ · · · −→ G 6 to bound A's advantage relative to S. See Figures 9 and 10 . Some of these games utilize as subroutines those shown in Figure 8 , which together implement a modified version of an ideal cipher in which sampling with replacement is done (instead of the usual sampling without replacement). (The parameter s is used to allow multiple instances of the objects. Namely, different s indicate distinct tables E and D.) We will justify that Figure 9 : Games used in proof of Theorem 7.2. Subroutines Choose-E and Choose-D are detailed in Figure 8 . Game G 4 uses a random function f mapping from {0,
any v, m. The change to line 511 is justified since C post (C −pre (k, x), ·) is a bijection for any k, x (since C pre is also a bijection). Thus the variables involved maintain the same (joint) distribution, justifying (19) .
(Game G 6 ) In the final game we drop code that handled the setting of bad in G 5 . Now we see that this final game G 6 is exactly implementing the oracles (f geval , S f E , S f D ), justifying (20) . All that remains is to bound the probability of bad being set in game G 5 . We proceed via case analysis.
The flag bad might be set due to line 502 or line 524. For line 524, however, the loop and conditional of 520 and 521 ensure that 524 will never be executed when D[0, k, y] = ⊥. To see this, note that D[0, k, y] is assigned a value only if one of lines 505 or 513 is also executed. Thus, if D[0, k, y] = ⊥ during a O 2 (k, y) query, then necessarily there exists a j ∈ [1 .. i] such that k = k j and y = y j where (k j , x j ) = C pre (v j , m j ) and y j = C post (v i , m i , w i ). This is so because C pre and C post (v i , m i , ·) are bijections. Thus, bad will never get set on line 524.
We turn to bounding the probability that line 502 sets bad. For bad to be set here, it must be that some query O 0 (v, m) was made for which v ∈ {IV } ∪ V at the time of the query and E[1, k, x] = ⊥. But E[1, k, x] can only be set to a non-bottom value if line 525 previously executed and here x was uniformly selected. Let V * be the set V at the end of A's execution. Let x be a value sampled due to execution of line 523 for a query O 2 (k, y). Then we want to assess the probability that A can make a later query v, m to O 0 for which C pre (v, m) = (k, x). Re-writing this last equation we have (v, m) = C −pre (k, x) and thus v = C −pre 1 (k, x). Then we will justify that where the indicated events are defined in the natural way (over the coins used in executing A G5 ). We can bound the first term on the right as follows. Since x is a uniformly-chosen point, and by the fact that C −pre 1 (k, ·) is a bijection, we have the probability that C −pre 1 (k, x) = IV with probability at most 2 −n . We can bound the second term as follows. Each value w added to V in the course of the game is the output of the random function f on some pair v, m. These points are chosen independently of the value v and there are at most q 0 + q 1 outputs of f chosen in the course of the game. Thus the probability of any one of these independent points being equal to C −pre 1 (k, x) is at most (q 0 + q 1 )/2 n . Together, we see that for the probability of setting bad due to E[1, k, x] being set for any particular O 2 query is at most (1 + q 0 + q 1 )/2 n , justifying the equations above.
Finally, since there are at most q 2 queries to O 2 , and consequently at most q 2 values x sampled due to execution of line 525 we have via a straightforward union bound that Pr A G5 sets bad ≤ q 2 (1 + q 0 + q 1 ) 2 n .
This completes the proof.
That is, E + simply iterates over the query-response pairs provided in the advice string and, upon finding a response that matches z, outputs the corresponding domain point. There are two cases to consider. First assume A made a P -query on x before extraction query (z, α). Then E + will extract x from the advice string. Thus this case cannot contribute to A's advantage. On the other hand, assume A makes extraction query Ex(z, α) for which z has not been already returned by P . Any subsequent P -query will return z with probability at most 1/2 n . Since A can query at most q times to P , this means that the probability of hitting one such z is at most q/2 n .
B Preimage Awareness of Iteration without Strengthening
We formalize a variant of preimage resistance, following [22] . Let h P : Dom → Rng be a hash function for an ideal primitive P . An inversion adversary A takes no inputs, has access to a primitive oracle P , and outputs a point x ∈ Dom. For fixed value IV ∈ Rng, we define the experiment Exp inv h,P,IV,A by the following pseudocode x ←$ A P ; Ret h P (x) = IV We associate to inv-adversary A, hash function H P , and constant IV ∈ Rng the advantage relation Adv inv h,P,IV (A) = Pr Exp inv h,P,IV,A ⇒ true . where the probability is taken over the coins used to execute the inv experiment. It is easy to verify that for the idealprimitive-based compression functions we consider, the advantage in this game is low for any IV and any adversary. For example, for f = RF d+n,n , we have that Adv inv f,IV (A) ≤ q p /2 n for any adversary A making at most q p queries. We have the following result.
Theorem B.1 [Itr achieves PrA] Fix n, d > 0 and let P be an ideal primitive. Let h P : {0, 1} n+d → {0, 1} n be a compression function, and let H = Itr[h P ] using some constant IV ∈ {0, 1} n . Let E h be an arbitrary extractor for the PAexperiment involving h. Then there exists an extractor E H such that for all pra-adversaries A making at most q p primitive queries and q e extraction queries and outputing a message of at most max ≥ 1 blocks there exists an pra-adversary B and an inv-adversary C such that . E H runs in time at most max · Time(E h ). B runs in time at most that of A plus O(q e max ), makes at most q p + max · NumQueries(h) primitive queries, and makes at most q e max extraction queries. C runs in time that of B and makes the same number of primitive queries.
The proof can be adapted easily from that used for SMD. Namely, the probability of the last case (where suffix-freeness is invoked) of the case analysis occurring can be shown to imply the existance of a natural inversion adversary. (This is simply the projection of C −pre to its left output.) Stam has shown that the Group-2 PGV schemes from [7] are also Type-II.
Theorem C.1 [The Group-2/Type-II PGV schemes are PrA in the iteration.] Fix κ, n > 0, let E ←$ BC(κ, n). Let P be an ideal primitive providing an interfacs to E and E −1 . Let h P be a Type-II blockcipher-based compression function, and let H = Itr[h P ] for some constant IV ∈ {0, 1} n . There exists an extractor E such that for any adversary A making at most q p queries to P and q e extraction queries we have again that the probability of creating the edge is at most (1 + q e + k + (i − 1))/(2 n − (k + (i − 1))).
Thus, by a union bound
(q e + k + i) = 1 2 n − q p (q p − k)(q e + k) + (q p − k)(q p − k + 1) 2 ≤ q p − k 2 n − q p 2(q e + k) + (q p − k + 1) 2
where the final line is overly conservative because it sets k = 0 outside of the parentheses, and k = q p inside. (We choose to use this looser bound for presentation purposes, and anyway it suffices.) Altogether then, (22) 
D Alternative Formulation for Preimage Awareness
A two-stage pa-adversary A = (A 1 , A 2 ) is a pair of algorithms. The challenge selection algorithm A 1 runs on no input and has access to a primitive oracle P . It outputs a triple (z, α, st) where z ∈ Rng, α ∈ {0, 1} * is an advice string, and st ∈ {0, 1} * is a string representing arbitrary state information. The preimage selection algorithm A 2 runs on input z, st, has oracle access to P , and outputs a preimage x ∈ Dom. Then the 1-PrA experiment Exp
1-pra
H,E,A is defined by the pseudocode (z, α, st) ←$ A P 1 ; x ← E(z, α) ; x ←$ A P 2 (z, st) ; Ret (x = x ∧ H P (x ) = z)
To H, E, and A we associate the advantage relation
Adv

1-pra
H,E (A) = Pr Exp
H,E,A ⇒ true where the probability is taken over the coins used in executing the experiment. The next theorem captures the simple hybrid that 1-PrA security implies full PrA security, but with a factor q e (the number of extraction queries) loss in concrete security. The proof (omitted) is by a simple hybrid argument.
Theorem D.1 [1-PrA ⇒ PrA] Let H P : Dom → Rng be a hash function. Let E be an extractor. Then there exists an extractor E such that for any pra-adversary A making q e extraction queries there exists a two-stage pra-adversary B = (B 1 , B 2 ) such that Adv pra H, E (A) ≤ q e ·Adv 1-pra H, E (B) . B runs in time that of A plus q e ·Time(E).
